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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
the Commission, the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to review the
order; that the statute authorizing such review violated the constitutional
provision limiting the appellate jurisdiction, and that the cause must be
transferred to the appropriate Court of Appeals. There being no constitu-
tional issue going to the merits of the case, and there being no "amount in
dispute" involved, the contention for upholding jurisdiction was that a
state officer was a party. Citing and following its prior decisions as to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Highway Commission, 6 the
Court held that even though the members of the Commission are State
officers the Commission is a separate and distinct entity existing apart from
its individual members and is not a state. officer within the provision in the
constitution conferring jurisdiction where a state officer is a party.
While ordinarily it would be true that the absence of appellate jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court would necessarily make proper a removal to a
Court of Appeals, the action in this case would appear doubtful since the
statute reads in part "no court of this state, except the circuit courts to the
extent herein specified and the Supreme Court on appeal, shall have juris-
diction to review, reverse, correct or annul an order or decision of the Com-
mission .... -"7 This would seem specifically to exclude the Courts. of Appeals
from exerciseing any jurisdiction over the orders of the Commission. Logi-
cally, the combination of the constitutional and statutory provisions would
seem to preclude any appellate review in those cases where the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the constitution did not inhere in a cause.
The decision does not, of course, invalidate the statutory appeal to the
Supreme Court in all cases, but only in those not within the constitutional
classification. The decision seems to defeat the statutory scheme intended
by the Legislature. It must be recognized that it is generally impossible
to determine the "amount involved" in eases like the instant one.
R. S. L. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-BANKRUPTCY-MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY ACT.-
The respondent water improvement district in a farming area of Texas, tax
ridden and insolvent, presented a plan of final settlement on $800,000 in
improvement bonds proposing a payment of 49.8 cents on the dollar under
sections 78, 79 and 80 of the Bankruptcy Act, which were added by an
amendment of 1934.1 The amendment provides for the readjustment of the
indebtedness of state subdivisions which are in the financial predicament of
the respondent and authorizes a federal court to require objecting bond-
holders to accept offers to scale down or repudiate indebtedness without the
surrender of any property by the subdivisions. Held, the amendment is an
unconstitutional exercise of congressional power amounting to an impair-
ment of state sovereignty. The majority of the court was of the opinion
6 State ex rel. Goldman v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sion et al. (1930) 325 Mo. 153, 27 S. W. (2d) 1026; State Highway Com-
mission v. Day (1931) 327 Mo. 122, 35 S. W. (2d) 37.
'R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5234.
1 (May 24, 1934) 48 Stat. 798; 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 301, et seq.
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that "the power 'to establish-uniform state laws on the subject of bank-
ruptcies'1 can have no higher rank or importance in our scheme of govern-
ment than 'the power to lay and collect taxes.' 2 Both are granted by the
same section of the Constitution and we can find no reason for saying that
one is impliedly limited by the necessity of preserving independence of the
states, while the other is not." And, continuing, "Neither the consent or
submission of the State can enlarge the powers of Congress, none can exist
other than those which are granted." Nor, says the majority, can the states
impair contracts indirectly by "granting any permission necessary to enable
Congress to do so." A consent by Mr. Justice Cardozo was concurred in by
the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Stone.3
It would seem that the federal power over brankruptcy should not be
used to supersede the states' power over expenditures by their local govern-
mental units.4. It is submitted that the majority of the court reached a
sound result since the bankruptcy idea is an outgrowth of the law mer-
chant and was only applicable originally to private traders.5 It is histor-
ically inapplicable to local or public corporations, for over these the state
has always been thought to have complete control.0
The situation might well be different in case the financial structure of
the whole government comes to depend on the status of municipal financing,
that is, if a majority, of all bonds become defaulting municipal issues.7 In
such an instance the federal power might well be invoked, but it would not
be exercised under the bankruptcy clause but rather under the power to
regulate the currency. Such a situation would be analogous to those pre-
sented in the recent gold decisions handed down by the Supreme Court.8
The holding of the majority in the principal case is also significant in
that it would seem to indicate rather clearly that the recent Minnesota
11 U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, clause 4.
2 U. S. Const., Art I.
a Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District (1936) 56 S.
Ct. 892.
4 Note, State Control Over Local Finance Under the N. I. R. A., 19 ST.
LOUIS L. REV., at 60, where that writer refers to the problem here in-
volved. At p. 59 it is pointed out how difficult it is to draw the line between
the power of the states to control local governmental affairs on the one
hand and the right of Congress to provide for the general welfare of the
other. The conclusion is reached that "the power of municipalities to bor-
row money and incur indebtedness is essential to their existence and, there-
fore, one of the most important subjects of control by the state."
I 2 BI. -Com. 471. 34 & 35 Hy. VIII, chap. 4 (1543) the first English
bankruptcy statute, was directed against fraudulent debtors. It was not
until 1841 that private persons other than tradesmen were able to take ad-
vantage of the bankruptcy laws. The statute, 24 & 25 Vict. chap. 134 (1861)
while largely a codification of former statutes on the subject, extended the
bankruptcy provision to non-traders.
6 See Meriweth6r v. Garrett (1880) 102 U. S. 472.
7 For authority that such a contingency is more than -a mere possibility
see Mr. Justice Carodozo's dissent in the principal case. Also see Lashly,
21 A. B. A. J. at 235. The problem of municipal embarrassment is becom-
ing alarmingly acute on many fronts.8 Norman v. B. & 0. R. Co. (1935) 294 U. S. 240.
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moratorium case9 did not render the contract-impairment clause of the con-
stitution unimportant. It would seem that the moratorium case merely
holds that the state may alter remedies and for that reason is to be distin-
guished from the earlier decision in Bronson v. Kinziel o where the right
was impaired as the statute provided for a minimum of two-thirds of the
indebtedness against the property on foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
premises. L. H. F. '36.
Editor's Note.-By an order signed June 18, 1936, by Mr. Justice Roberts
the decision in the instant case has been stayed and a rehearing will prob-
ably be granted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS: FREEDOM OF CONTRACT-MINIMUM
WAGE LAws.-The Supreme Court, once again, has refused to remove the
impediment it placed in the path of minimum wage legislation thirteen
years ago.' In the most recent case2 the court has declared unconstitutional
the New York Minimum Wage Law for women and children.3 The case
arose on an application for a writ of habeas corpus by the relator, a laun-
dry operator, who was arrested and charged with having paid a woman
employee less than the "minimum fair wage" set by the Industrial Com-
missioner. The official was ordered by the law to establish a "minimum fair
wage" rate where he found an oppressive wage to exist in any industry or
trade, excluding domestic and farm occupations. The Act defined an un-
reasonable and oppressive wage as one which is less than the fair value of
the employee's services and insufficient to meet the cost of living. Adequate
standards to guide in the establishment of the wage rate were provided.
The relator's attack upon the Act was based solely on the invalidity of wage-
regulation as such. The state sought to distinguish the instant law from
that which was declared unconstitutional in the Adkins case.4 Held, four
justices dissenting, that the law was unconstitutional in that it deprived
employers and employees of that freedom of contract guaranteed by due
process of law.
While it is important to preserve to persons the freedom to contract
about their affairs, it is likewise necessary to prevent the abuse of this
liberty so that it may not be used to defeat all public interests and thereby
destroy the very freedom of opportunity which it is designed to safeguard.
The guaranty of liberty of contract simply implies the absence of arbitrary
restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulation and prohibitions de-
signed to promote public welfare.5
'Home Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U. S. 398, 88 A. L. R.
1481.
10 (1840) 1 How. 311, 11 L. ed. 143.
1 Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525.
2 Morehead v. Tipaldo, People ex rel. (June 1, 1936) 56 S. Ct. 918. Affirm-
ing 270 N. Y. 233, 200 N. E. 799.
S Laws of 1933, chap. 584.
4 (1918) 40 Stat. 960.
5 Chicago, etc. R. R. v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549, 567; German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1914) 233 U. S. 389, 417.
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